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DEFEATING THE PREFERENCE SYSTEM: USING THE 
SUBSEQUENT NEW VALUE DEFENSE AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE CLAIMS TO “DOUBLE DIP” 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Code (Code) provides a mechanism called “preference 
avoidance” through which a creditor can be forced to disgorge payments 
received from a debtor during the ninety days prior to the filing of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy case.1 A preferential transfer is “[a] prebankruptcy transfer made 
by an insolvent debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor, thereby allowing the 
creditor to receive more than its proportionate share of the debtor’s assets.”2 To 
defend against disgorgement, a creditor may assert that it gave the debtor 
“subsequent new value” in the form of goods shipped by the creditor to the 
debtor that balance out the net effect to the debtor’s estate from the creditor’s 
preference.3 The Code also allows a creditor to receive priority payment from 
the debtor’s estate for goods shipped twenty days before the bankruptcy filing.4 
What if a creditor could ensure that it keep its preferences and receive a 
priority position on payments owed to it? Would that comply with the policy 
goals behind the Code? 
The argument for using the same goods as both an administrative expense 
and as subsequent new value appeared for the first time in In re Commissary 
Operations.5 In In re Commissary Operations, the bankruptcy court for the 
Middle District of Tennessee allowed a creditor to claim both a subsequent 
new value defense and an administrative expense for the same goods.6 
 
 1 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsections (c) and (i) of this section, the trustee 
may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property . . . made on or within 90 days before the date of 
the filing of the petition . . . .”). 
 2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (8th ed. 2004).  
 3 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (“The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer to or for the benefit of a 
creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the 
debtor . . . .”). 
 4 Id. § 503(b)(9) (“After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative 
expenses . . . including the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date of 
commencement of a case under this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course 
of such debtor’s business.”). 
 5 Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 873, 
879 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
 6 Id. 
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However, less than a year later, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District 
of Georgia encountered the same argument in the 2010 case TI Acquisition, 
LLC v. Southern Polymer and concluded to the contrary.7 Both courts reached 
their conclusions by viewing the matter from the perspective of the creditor.8 
The first court justified its decision as being based on a plain language 
interpretation of the Code and pursued a formalistic approach in distinguishing 
the case from earlier decisions.9 In contrast, the second court put stronger 
emphasis on policy and took a functionalist approach to the Code, concluding 
that allowing a creditor to assert both a subsequent new value defense and an 
administrative expense for the same goods would upset the bankruptcy policy 
goal of equality among creditors.10 
This Comment will refer to the use of the § 547(c)(4) subsequent new value 
defense for the same goods that a creditor claims a § 503(b)(9) administrative 
expense for as “double dipping,” a term used by some in the bankruptcy 
community to describe this issue.11 This Comment addresses two primary 
issues: whether courts should allow creditors to double dip and, if not, what 
legal tools judges and lawyers can use to fight the practice. 
It may be years before the appellate courts answer these questions. Some 
commentators have argued that district courts, charged with overseeing the 
decisions of the bankruptcy courts, “neglect their bankruptcy appeals” and 
simply “rubber stamp the bankruptcy court.”12 Frequently, creditors do not 
appeal bankruptcy decisions. Given the need for speedy resolution of 
bankruptcy issues, the matter may become moot by the time the creditor gets to 
the district court, much less the courts of appeals. Thus, resolution of the issue 
in higher courts might be years away. 
 
 7 TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377, 385 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2010). 
 8 See generally In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. 377; In re Commissary Operations, 421 B.R. 873. 
 9 See In re Commissary Operations, 421 B.R. at 878–79. 
 10 See In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. at 385. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177–79 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5785, 6138–40. 
 11 See, e.g., Rudolph J. Di Massa Jr. & Laura D. Bonner, ‘Double Dipping’ New Value Defense and 
Administrative Expense Claims, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 7, 2010, available at http://www.duanemorris. 
com/articles/double_dipping_new_value_defense_administrative_expense_claims_3666.html.  
 12 Commission Considers Venue, Jurisdiction, Appellate Changes at February Meeting, 15 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Apr. 1996, at 1, 13; see also Jennifer M. D’Angelo, Comment, If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them: 
Inclusive Joinder and the Filtering of Article III Status into the Bankruptcy Courts, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 
603, 610 (2006) (noting that, between 1978 and 1984, the Emergency Rule had stripped bankruptcy judges of 
Article III power, but that bankruptcies continued “with the bankruptcy courts deciding almost everything and 
with review by the district judges usually being little more than a cursory ‘rubber stamp’ procedure” (quoting 
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 4.2, at 227–28 (1997))). 
SEARS GALLEYSFINAL 6/8/2012 9:07 AM 
2012] DEFEATING THE PREFERENCE SYSTEM 595 
This Comment will focus on two options that a bankruptcy court should 
use to prevent double dipping: (1) ban double dipping outright, or (2) use 
§ 502(d) to disallow an administrative expense claim until the creditor has 
disgorged the preference. 
In re Circuit City Stores held that § 502(d) could be used to disallow 
§ 503(b)(9) administrative expense claims by virtue of the fact that § 503(b)(9) 
claims arose prior to the petition date, making those seeking to double dip 
“creditors” under the Code.13 Because the § 503(b)(9) claimants were 
considered creditors, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned that they must file a proof 
of claim.14 In filing the proof of claim, the administrative expense claimant is 
brought into compliance with § 501(a) and thus § 502(a).15 Therefore, the 
Court determined that § 502(d) can be used to disallow proofs of claims by 
§ 503(b)(9) creditors.16 The Circuit City court reasoned that “[t]he goals of 
equitable distribution and efficiency support the conclusion that § 502(d) may 
be employed to temporarily disallow the [c]laimant’s [c]laims.”17 
Although In re Circuit City allowed § 502(d) disallowance of § 503(b)(9) 
administrative expense claims, the scope of the decision remains unclear. The 
court employed certain modifiers in its framing of the issue that might be used 
in the future to limit its holding. Namely, the court distinguished between 
transfers that are avoidable and those that are “potentially recoverable.”18 
However, requests to use § 502(d) to disallow a § 503(b)(9) administrative 
expense claim have been denied by many bankruptcy courts that have noted 
that nothing in § 502(d) explicitly pertains to § 503(b)(9).19 Further, at least 
one bankruptcy court has suggested that § 502(d) is only applicable to 
prepetition claims.20 This court reasoned that § 503(b)(9) claims are not 
 
 13 In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 502(a) (2006). 
 16 In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 571. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 566. 
 19 See, e.g., S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742, 750 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009); In re Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc., 394 B.R. 147, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008); 
Roberds, Inc. v. Broyhill Furniture (In re Roberds, Inc.), 315 B.R. 443, 476 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004); Beasley 
Forest Prods., Inc. v. Durango Ga. Paper Co. (In re Durango Ga. Paper Co.), 297 B.R. 326, 330–31 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ga. 2003); In re Lids Corp., 260 B.R. 680, 683–84 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); Camelot Music, Inc. v. MHW 
Adver. & Pub. Relations, Inc. (In re CM Holdings, Inc.), 264 B.R. 141, 157–58 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000). 
 20 See, e.g., In re TI Acquisition, 410 B.R. at 751 (reasoning that § 503(b)(9) claims are administrative 
expenses and not prepetition claims and, therefore, not subject to disallowance under § 502(d)). 
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prepetition claims.21 Section 503(b)(9) claims are unique because they are 
administrative expenses—typically reserved for postpetition claims—but arise 
out of prepetition activities.22 Bankruptcy courts should categorize § 503(b)(9) 
claims as prepetition contingent claims, the underlying substance of which 
arises from prepetition activities but whose status as an administrative expense 
is contingent on particular activity from the debtor. The particular activity from 
the debtor in this situation would be the filing of bankruptcy within twenty 
days of having received a shipment of goods from the creditor. 
For courts that permit the use of § 502(d) to disallow a § 503(b)(9) claim, 
the only option is to forbid double dipping altogether. However, the Code does 
not explicitly prevent a creditor from claiming both § 547(c)(4) subsequent 
new value in the context of a preference action and a § 503(b)(9) 
administrative expense for the same goods.23 It seems that formalism does not 
resolve the issue. 
The goal of this Comment is to advocate against allowing creditors to 
double dip in bankruptcy proceedings and to give courts tools to prevent 
creditors from doing so. Permitting double dipping will lead to unequal 
treatment among creditors in bankruptcy proceedings and, on rare occasions, 
allow savvy debtors to protect favored creditors in the weeks leading up to 
bankruptcy filings. 
This Comment will use two different proceedings from one bankruptcy 
case pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District 
of Georgia: In re TI Acquisition, LLC, Case No. 08-42370-MGD. In late 2009, 
the court in TI Acquisition issued an opinion addressing § 502(d) just before In 
re Commissary Operations was decided.24 In 2010, after the decision in In re 
Commissary Operations, the TI Acquisition court issued its opinion in a 
preference action arising out of the main bankruptcy case, Adversary 
Proceeding No. 09-04009-MGD, with regard to whether the creditor was 
entitled to a § 503(b)(9) administrative expense claim for the same goods for 
 
 21 See, e.g., id. at 749. 
 22 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006) (governing the shipment of goods twenty days before the 
bankruptcy filing, an action that can only occur prepetition), with id. § 503(b)(1)–(8) (governing actions taken 
by the debtor that can only occur postpetition). 
 23 But see In re TI Acquisition, 410 B.R. at 749 (holding that § 502(d) cannot disallow an administrative 
expense claim). Less than a year later, the same judge held that a creditor cannot claim both a § 547(c)(4) 
subsequent new value defense and a § 503(b)(9) administrative expense for the same goods. See TI 
Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377, 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 24 See Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 
873 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010); In re TI Acquisition, 410 B.R. 742. 
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which that same creditor was asserting the § 547(c)(4) subsequent new value 
defense.25 For ease of reference, the 2009 decision regarding § 502(d) is 
referred to as “TI Acquisition I”26 and the 2010 decision regarding § 503(b)(9) 
and § 547(c)(4) is referred to as “TI Acquisition II.”27 
This Comment addresses four distinct bankruptcy court opinions: In re 
Commissary Operations, TI Acquisition I, TI Acquisition II, and In re Circuit 
City. The courts in In re Commissary Operations and TI Acquisition II are in 
direct conflict with one another with regard to whether the same new value 
goods may be used for a § 547(c)(4) subsequent new value defense and a 
§ 503(b)(9) administrative expense claim.28 This Comment will first argue that 
the TI Acquisition II court’s decision to ban double dipping altogether is the 
better approach. This Comment argues that if the court refuses to ban double 
dipping, the challenging party should try to use § 502(d) to disallow a 
creditor’s § 503(b)(9) administrative expense claim until the creditor repays 
the preference it received. The second issue that this Comment addresses is the 
remaining two cases, TI Acquisition I and In re Circuit City, which stand in 
conflict with each other as to whether § 502(d) may be used to disallow 
administrative expense claims when the same new value goods are used for a 
subsequent new value defense.29 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. General Background of § 547 
Section 547 of the Code allows a trustee or a debtor to demand repayment 
of any preferential transfer paid to a creditor.30 A preferential transfer is a 
“prebankruptcy transfer made by an insolvent debtor to or for the benefit of a 
creditor, thereby allowing the creditor to receive more than its proportionate 
share of the debtor’s assets.”31 A preferential transfer must occur within ninety 
days of the bankruptcy filing (in the case of a non-insider creditor) or a year 
 
 25 See In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. at 379. 
 26 In re TI Acquisition, 410 B.R. 742. 
 27 In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. 377. 
 28 Compare In re Commissary Operations, 421 B.R. at 879, with In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. at 385. 
 29 Compare In re TI Acquisition, 410 B.R. at 751, with In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 579 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). 
 30 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006). 
 31 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1217. 
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before the bankruptcy filing (in the case of an insider creditor).32 Section 547 
grants the trustee the power to void any preferential transfer that occurred 
under the conditions of § 547(b).33 When a trustee exercises this power, the 
creditor must then return whatever it received during the preference period to 
the debtor’s estate. 
Once the creditor has turned over the property it received during the 
preference period to the debtor’s estate, § 502(h) affords that creditor the 
opportunity to assert a claim against the debtor’s estate for the amount 
disgorged, putting that creditor on an even playing field with other general 
unsecured creditors34 whose claims will be paid on a pro rata basis out of the 
estate’s assets.35 Often, the pro rata distribution a creditor receives is 
significantly less than the face value of its claim because there are not enough 
funds in the estate to pay all claims in full.36 Accordingly, the ability to assert a 
§ 502(h) claim for any returned preferential payments provides little comfort to 
a creditor, who might utilize every weapon in its arsenal to reduce its 
preference liability and avoid paying cash into the debtor’s estate. One such 
weapon is the subsequent new value defense. 
1. The Subsequent New Value Defense 
The Code provides a number of defenses to preference actions, including 
the “subsequent new value defense” under § 547(c)(4).37 The Code defines 
“new value” as “money or money’s worth in goods, services, or new credit, or 
release by a transferee of property previously transferred to [a] transferee in a 
transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under 
 
 32 The date of the transfer is the date the check was received by the creditor, contrary to the legislative 
history of § 547(c), which had said that the date would be when the check was delivered. 5 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 547.04[4][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011); id. ¶ 547.04 n.99; see 
Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992). 
 33 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property–(1) 
to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such 
transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made [on or within 90 days before the 
bankruptcy filing or one year before the bankruptcy filing in the case of an insider]; and (5) that enables such 
creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if–(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this 
title; (B) the transfer had not been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent 
provided by the provision of this title.”). 
 34 Id. § 502(h). 
 35 Id. § 726(b). 
 36 4 COLLIER, supra note 32, ¶ 507.02[1]. 
 37 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (“The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer . . . to or for the benefit 
of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the 
debtor.”). 
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any applicable law.”38 The subsequent new value defense usually applies when 
a debtor and a creditor have an open account together and the creditor regularly 
extends credit to the debtor.39 During the preference period, the creditor 
receives a transfer from the debtor and then, subsequently, ships new goods to 
the debtor before the debtor files for bankruptcy.40 When the estate of the 
debtor approaches the creditor to force the creditor to disgorge the preference 
under § 547(b), the creditor asserts that the goods shipped to the debtor after 
his preferential transfer offset the loss of value to the debtor’s estate caused by 
the purported preferential transfer.41 Thus, the net value of the debtor’s estate 
remained unchanged during the preference period. 
As an example, consider a debtor who orders $100,000 worth of goods on 
credit 100 days before filing for bankruptcy. At ninety days before bankruptcy, 
he pays $100,000 for those goods and orders $100,000 more of goods. The 
creditor ships those goods eighty days before the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
When the debtor finally does file for bankruptcy, the trustee will approach the 
creditor to disgorge the $100,000 it received during the preference period that 
began ninety days before the debtor’s filing. Using the subsequent new value 
defense of § 547(c)(4), the creditor will argue that it does not have to disgorge 
the $100,000 it received on day ninety because it already sent $100,000 worth 
of goods to the debtor on day eighty. While this will block attempts by the 
trustee to force the creditor to disgorge the day-ninety $100,000 the creditor 
received, the creditor is still out the day-eighty $100,000 worth of goods. The 
essential feature of this defense is that two different transactions, one that 
depletes the estate for a certain amount and another that replenishes the estate 
for that same amount in goods, will “net out” and cancel each other with regard 
to their effect on the debtor’s estate.42 
The subsequent new value defense has limits on its applicability. The first 
limitation is that the goods that constitute the subsequent new value must not 
be secured by a security interest that is otherwise unavoidable in bankruptcy.43 
However, the subsequent new value defense may still be applicable in 
 
 38 Id. § 547(a)(2). 
 39 Robert S. Bernstein, A Primer on Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy, BERNSTEIN LAW FIRM, http:// 
www.bernsteinlaw.com/publications/preferential/pref11.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2012). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See 5 COLLIER, supra note 32, ¶ 547.04[4]. 
 42 See id. 
 43 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D 
§ 66:36, at 66-167 (2008). 
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situations in which the goods are only partially secured.44 The defense would 
cover the unsecured value of the partially secured goods. There is no consensus 
yet among the courts as to which view is correct.45 
The second limitation on the subsequent new value defense is that any 
payment due for the goods shipped as subsequent new value must be 
unavoidable in bankruptcy.46 Section 547(c)(4)(B) bars a party from using the 
subsequent new value defense if the debtor made “an otherwise unavoidable 
transfer to or for the benefit of [the] creditor.”47 In other words, any new value 
the creditor sends the debtor must not be secured by something else in the 
debtor’s estate.48 
While the definition of “new value” may seem clear from the statute,49 
there is a split in the courts as to whether a forbearance of a debtor’s obligation 
to pay can constitute new value. The majority of courts have reasoned that 
such forbearance will not constitute new value,50 though some allow the 
continued use of items like rental property to be new value.51 In none of those 
jurisdictions will mere forgiveness of a preexisting debt or obligation on the 
part of the creditor create new value for the debtor’s estate. 
2. Claims for Administrative Expenses for Goods Shipped Within Twenty 
Days Prior to the Filing of the Bankruptcy Petition 
The subsequent new value defense is not the only tool a creditor has at its 
disposal to get and maintain an edge over other creditors. Congress added 
§ 503(b)(9) to the Code with the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005,52 allowing suppliers of goods an administrative expense claim 
 
 44 See, e.g., In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 393 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 45 See 4 NORTON, supra note 43, § 66:36, at 66-167. 
 46 Id. 
 47 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4)(B) (2006). 
 48 See 5 COLLIER, supra note 32, ¶ 547.04[4]. 
 49 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2). 
 50 In re ABC-NACO, Inc., 483 F.3d 470, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Jones Truck Lines v. Cent. 
States (In re Jones Truck Lines), 130 F.3d 323, 327 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[A] forbearance is usually not new 
value.”); Am. Bank of Martin Cnty. v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart), 845 F.2d 
293, 298 (11th Cir. 1988) (“An agreement by an undersecured creditor to forgo its right to foreclose on 
collateral cannot be treated as a new value under [§] 547.”); Charisma Inv. Co. v. Airport Sys., Inc. (In re Jet 
Fla. Sys., Inc.), 841 F.2d 1082, 1084 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 51 See, e.g., In re Air Conditioning, Inc., 845 F.2d at 298 (holding that continued use of rental property by 
the debtor constituted new value for purposes of § 527(c)(4)). 
 52 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1227(b), 
119 Stat. 23, 200. 
SEARS GALLEYSFINAL 6/8/2012 9:07 AM 
2012] DEFEATING THE PREFERENCE SYSTEM 601 
against the debtor’s estate for goods shipped to the debtor within twenty days 
of the petition date to prevent the proverbial “race to the courthouse” from 
occurring when the creditors smell blood in the water.53 Administrative 
expenses occupy the second highest priority of all unsecured claims54 with 
only secured creditors and unsecured domestic support obligations being paid 
first.55 With the exception of these new § 503(b)(9) claims, all administrative 
expenses can be thought of as falling into one of two categories: (1) those 
necessary for the continuing operation of the reorganizing debtor, and (2) those 
needed to pay the costs associated with the bankruptcy itself.56 Section 
503(b)(9) claims fall into neither of the older, pre-2005 categories for 
administrative expenses and stand alone among the other administrative 
expenses because § 503(b)(9) claims are essentially prepetition claims that are 
lumped together with and treated the same as postpetition claims.57 
A notable aspect of § 503(b)(9) is that it only applies to “goods.”58 
Bankruptcy courts follow the Uniform Commercial Code’s (U.C.C.’s) 
definition of “goods”59 when examining administrative expense claims.60 
Additionally, the debtor must have physically received the goods for the 
creditor’s claim to qualify as an administrative expense.61 Thus, courts will not 
entertain administrative expense claims under § 503(b)(9) that were services 
performed or the forgiveness of a preexisting debt. While the Code accepts the 
U.C.C. definition of “goods,” it does not accept its definition of “value.”62 The 
Code distinguishes itself from the U.C.C. by requiring that the transfer for 
which “value” is sought not be voidable under applicable law.63 Moreover, the 
 
 53 See In re Bookbinders’ Rest., No. 06-12302ELF, 2006 WL 3858020, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 
2006) (citing In re HQ Global Holdings, 282 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)). 
 54 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2). 
 55 Id. § 507(a). 
 56 In re Bookbinders’ Rest., 2006 WL 3858020, at *3. 
 57 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9), with id. § 503(b)(1)–(8). 
 58 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). 
 59 U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2004) (“Goods means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which 
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to 
be paid, investment securities . . .[,] and things in action.”). 
 60 4 COLLIER, supra note 32, ¶ 503.16[1]; see, e.g., In re Goody’s Family Clothing, 401 B.R. 131, 134 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (citing the “near unanimous” adoption of the U.C.C. across the country and concluding 
that the § 503(b)(9) term “goods” conforms to the U.C.C. definition of “goods”). 
 61 See In re Pridgen, No. 07-04531-8-RDD, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1274, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 
2008). 
 62 5 COLLIER, supra note 32, ¶ 547.02[2]. 
 63 Id. 
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“value” may not be given in satisfaction of an antecedent debt or be a 
substitution of an obligation for an existing obligation.64 
Section 503(b)(9) also requires that all transactions that a debtor or creditor 
argues are administrative expenses must have occurred in the “ordinary course 
of business.”65 Some courts employ two tests to determine whether the sale of 
goods occurred in the ordinary course of business.66 The first test, the 
horizontal test, compares the business transaction at issue to the type of 
transactions engaged in by other businesses across the same industry.67 The 
second test—the vertical test—compares the business transaction at issue 
against other transactions undertaken by the same business.68 Some 
jurisdictions require the creditor to satisfy both tests for a sale to qualify as 
made in the ordinary course of business.69 Other courts only employ the 
vertical test because the horizontal test violates principles of statutory 
construction, is redundant, and is difficult to apply.70 
While the horizontal and vertical tests were used as the standard by which 
bankruptcy courts measure whether administrative expense claims concerned 
goods shipped in the “ordinary course of business,” this leads to creditors 
trying to double dip. 
3. Double Dipping 
A new question arose at the start of 2010: can a creditor assert a subsequent 
new value defense for the same goods for which it wishes to claim postpetition 
as an administrative expense? The case In re Commissary Operations was the 
first instance of a bankruptcy court dealing with this particular argument.71 
 
 64 Id. In other words, a creditor may not agree to forgive a debt in exchange for the debtor agreeing to a 
new debt in the same amount, just to bring the debt into the preference period for administrative expenses. 
 65 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006). 
 66 Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 705. 
 69 See id. (“Because both the vertical and horizontal dimension tests have been met, the postpetition 
leases were executed in the ordinary course of . . . business for [§] 549(a) purposes and are not avoidable as 
being outside the ordinary course.”). 
 70 In re Ockerlund Constr. Co., 308 B.R. 325, 329 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004); In re Husting Land & 
Dev., Inc., 255 B.R. 772, 779–80 (Bankr. D. Utah 2000). 
 71 Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 873, 
876 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010) (“Whether deliveries entitled to a § 503(b)(9) claim status are disqualified from 
constituting new value for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(a)(2) and 547(c)(4) is a question of first 
impression.”). 
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While distinguishing In re Commissary Operations from an earlier precedent 
dealing with reclamation claims,72 the court determined that creditors could 
claim an administrative expense for the same goods they wished to use as a 
subsequent new value defense.73 
 







The creditor ships goods to the debtor during period A. The debtor receives the 
goods and pays the creditor during period B, which falls within the preference 
period. By receiving payment for the goods in that period, the creditor has 
received a preference that it will have to disgorge when the debtor declares 
bankruptcy. Together, periods B and C make up the preference period, whereas 
only period C makes up the administrative expense period. After being paid in 
period B, the creditor ships more goods to the debtor during period C, within 
both the § 547 preference period and within the § 503(b)(9) administrative 
expense period. On day 0, the debtor files for bankruptcy. Pursuant to § 547, 
the creditor would have to return the preference it received during period B to 
the debtor’s estate but, in this case, the creditor will argue for an exception 
under § 547(c)(4). The creditor will claim that the goods it shipped in period C 
offset the preference it received in period B. Normally, that would mean that 
the creditor does not have to repay the preference to the debtor’s estate. 
However, the goods shipped during period C also fall within the § 503(b)(9) 
administrative expense period. Section 503(b)(9) allows the creditor to be paid 
in full from the debtor’s estate for the goods shipped twenty days prior to the 
bankruptcy filing. The creditor will try to double dip by using the goods 
shipped in period C to offset the preference received during period B and will 
attempt to be paid for the period C goods from the debtor’s estate as an 
 
 72 Id. at 877–78 (citing Phx. Rest. Grp. v. Proficient Food Co. (In re Phx. Rest. Grp.), 373 B.R. 541, 549 
(M.D. Tenn. 2007)). 
 73 Id. at 879. 
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administrative expense. The creditor in In re Commissary Operations 
successfully used this argument.74 
Shortly after In re Commissary Operations, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia visited the same issue in TI Acquisition II.75 The 
court in TI Acquisition II held, contrary to the holding in In re Commissary 
Operations, that a creditor could not use both a subsequent new value defense 
and an administrative expense claim for the same goods.76 The TI Acquisition 
II court reasoned, “[I]t would be inequitable and contrary to the statute to allow 
the [subsequent] new value defense to be used when the creditor has been paid 
in full, out of the debtor’s estate, for the new value shipments.”77 In other 
words, the court concluded that the creditor has to choose whether it wants to 
be paid under the subsequent new value defense or as an administrative 
expense claim. A creditor cannot argue both. The TI Acquisition II decision 
from the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia stands in direct 
contradiction to the In re Commissary Operations decision reached by the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. 
4. Section 502(d) and the Disallowance of an Administrative Expense Until 
the Creditor Repays the Transfer It Received from the Debtor 
Section 502(d) allows a court to disallow “any claim of any entity . . . that 
is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under [§] . . . 547 . . . unless such entity 
or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property.”78 Some 
courts have held, for instance, that § 502(d) disallows a creditor’s prepetition 
claim (such as an administrative expense claim under § 503(b)(9)) against a 
debtor until the creditor repays a transfer that would have been avoidable under  
§ 547.79 Other courts have held that an argument based on § 502(d) is 
inapplicable to administrative expense claims.80 
Section 502(d) is meant to be used when “something more than a gentle 
influence is needed” to persuade the creditor to cooperate with the trustee’s 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 See TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2010). 
 76 Id. at 385. 
 77 Id. 
 78 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2006). 
 79 See, e.g., In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). 
 80 See, e.g., ASM Capital v. Ames Dep’t Stores (In re Ames Dep’t Stores), 582 F.3d 422, 430 (2d. Cir. 
2009). 
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avoidance power.81 The trustee must establish the liability of the transferee to 
the estate for whatever property he received in order to trigger § 502(d).82 
Also, § 502(d) speaks only to whether the court will allow the transferee’s 
claim, not to whether there is any evidence to support the claim.83 The effect is 
that the transferee faces a choice of whether to receive payment for its 
§ 503(b)(9) claim now and risk liability of losing its preference at a later date 
or waive its § 503(b)(9) claim in favor of keeping its preference. How a 
creditor will make this decision depends on the order in which the issues arise 
in the bankruptcy case. While § 503(b)(9) administrative expense claims, like 
all administrative expense claims, are paid no later than at the time of plan 
confirmation,84 preference actions may take years longer.85 However, if the 
debtor is particularly low on funds, it may initiate the preference action much 
sooner, like the debtor in TI Acquisition II.86 
Because § 502(d) only has coercive effect, it cannot directly force the 
transferee to turn over a preference to the debtor’s estate.87 The coercive effect 
derives from the ability of the court to refuse payment from the debtor’s estate 
on any disallowed claim until the creditor has turned over the preference it 
allegedly owes.88 It has the result of forcing the creditor to choose whether it 
would prefer to keep the preference and lose the administrative expense claim, 
or turn over the preference to the estate for the chance of a favorable ruling on 
its administrative expense. The trustee’s mere assertion that a piece of property 
held by the transferee is an avoidable transfer is enough to allow the court to 
temporarily suspend any other claim the transferee may have against the estate 
until said transferee turns over the property the trustee claims is avoidable.89 
 
 81 See Campbell v. United States (In re Davis), 889 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 82 4 COLLIER, supra note 32, ¶ 502.05[1]. 
 83 Id. ¶ 502.05[2]. 
 84 Bankruptcy Creditor 503(b)(9) Administrative Expense, BURBAGE & WEDDELL LLC (June 18, 2009), 
http://www.burbageweddell.com/bankruptcy-creditor-rights-overview/section-503b9-administrative-expense-
claims/. 
 85 Preference Action (Bankruptcy) Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal. 
com/p/preference-action-bankruptcy/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (“Typically, a Trustee has two years from the 
bankruptcy petition date to bring the preference action.”). 
 86 TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377, 378–79 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 87 4 COLLIER, supra note 32, ¶ 502.05[1]. 
 88 Id. ¶ 502.05[2]. 
 89 Id. ¶ 502.05[2][a]. 
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Courts are divided in their use of § 502(d) to disallow § 503(b)(9) 
administrative expense claims to temporarily disallow the claim.90 For 
instance, the court in In re Circuit City disallowed a creditor’s administrative 
expense claim until that creditor returned the property transferred to it by the 
debtor that was potentially avoidable under § 547.91 The court, using 
arguments derived primarily from theories of statutory construction and noting 
the conflicting interpretations of § 503(b)(9), concluded that § 503(b)(9) 
claimants are “creditors” under § 101(10)(A) of the Code and, as per Rule 
3002 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, must file a claim pursuant 
to § 501(a).92 The Circuit City court noted that Fourth Circuit precedent made 
§ 502(d) disallowance applicable to claims filed under § 501(a).93 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. General Analysis of the Law with Regard to §§ 547(c)(4) and 503(b)(9) 
Before 2010, there were no reported court decisions addressing whether a 
transferee may use the same goods to assert both a subsequent new value 
defense under § 547(c)(4) and an administrative expense claim under 
§ 503(b)(9).94 A 2007 case, In re Phoenix Restaurant Group, dealt with a 
similar issue but did not directly address the point of subsequent new value and 
administrative expenses.95 
 
 90 Compare In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 579 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that 
§ 502(d) allows a bankruptcy court to disallow an administrative expense claim until transferred property is 
returned to the estate), with S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 
742, 751 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009) (holding that § 502(d) may not disallow an administrative expense claim 
asserted under § 503(b)(9)). 
 91 See In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 579. 
 92 See id. at 570; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2006) (“The term ‘creditor’ means [an] entity that has 
a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.”); id. 
§ 501(a) (“A creditor or an indenture trustee may file a proof of claim.”); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002 (“An 
unsecured creditor or an equity security holder must file a proof of claim or interest for the claim or interest to 
be allowed.” (emphasis added)). 
 93 See In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 569; see also Durham v. SMI Indus., 882 F.2d 881, 882–83 
(4th Cir. 1989) (“Since a court can only disallow a claim after one has been filed under [§ 501(a)], ‘claim’ in 
§ 502(d) includes only one for which a proof has been filed.”). 
 94 Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 873, 
876 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
 95 See Phx. Rest. Grp. v. Proficient Food Co. (In re Phx. Rest. Grp.), 373 B.R. 541, 547 (M.D. Tenn. 
2007) (holding that a reclamation claim could deplete a creditor’s subsequent new value defense because, by 
virtue of maintaining the power to reclaim the goods at any time, the creditor had not actually provided the 
debtor’s estate with new value). But see In re ABC-NACO, Inc., 483 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that because the creditor did not retain the right to revoke licenses it had conveyed to the debtor, it could not 
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In In re Phoenix Restaurant, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District 
of Tennessee examined a subsequent new value defense claimed by a creditor 
in the amount of $540,000.96 The creditor asserted both a reclamation claim on 
goods it had shipped within the preference period as well as a subsequent new 
value defense based on the value of those same goods.97 The court held that the 
creditor could not use both arguments because if the creditor reclaimed the 
goods, those goods would not have added new value to the estate.98 Otherwise, 
the court feared that the creditor “could count the same amount in its favor 
twice, and doing so would clearly place [the creditor] ahead of other creditors, 
defeating the purpose of § 547.”99 
Three years later, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee examined a similar issue in In re Commissary Operations. In that 
case the debtor, a grocer and owner of chain restaurants, initiated a bankruptcy 
proceeding in which more than 200 creditors asserted administrative expense 
claims arising under § 503(b)(9).100 Among those creditors, several sought to 
double dip by asserting a subsequent new value defense for certain goods and 
then filing an administrative expense claim to receive priority payment from 
the debtor’s estate.101 
The court in In re Commissary Operations used the reasoning of In re 
Phoenix Restaurant in deciding that a § 503(b)(9) administrative expense 
claim was analogous to a critical vendor claim.102 However, the court 
distinguished the administrative expense claim in In re Commissary 
Operations from reclamation claims because reclamation claims arise before 
the bankruptcy petition date while, by the court’s reasoning, § 503(b)(9) claims 
could arise only after the bankruptcy petition filing.103 Additionally, the court 
decided that goods shipped within the twenty-day prepetition window of 
 
use the value of not revoking those licenses in a subsequent new value defense). The distinction between these 
two cases may hinge on the difference between the power to “reclaim” and the power to “revoke.” 
 96 In re Phx. Rest. Grp., 373 B.R. at 546. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 548. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 873, 
875 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
 101 Id. at 875–76. 
 102 Id. at 878. “The critical vendor doctrine applies to vendors that are so vital to the continued business 
operations of the debtor that their refusal to sell to the debtor could mean the demise of the debtor and its 
reorganization.” Darren A. Pascarella, United States: The Critical Vendor Doctrine, MONDAQ.COM (Feb. 10, 
2004), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=24369. 
 103 In re Commissary Operations, 421 B.R. at 876–77. 
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§ 503(b)(9) were shipped “free of the seller’s strings,” while a creditor using a 
reclamation claim could reclaim the specific goods it had shipped to the debtor 
and thus those goods were not shipped “free of the seller’s strings.”104 
In examining congressional policy choices, the Commissary Operations 
court decided that prohibiting creditors from double dipping would force the 
creditor to choose between asserting its right to a § 503(b)(9) administrative 
expense claim and preserving its power to use a subsequent new value defense 
to defend its preference.105 To force creditors to make such a decision, the 
court reasoned, would “chill their willingness to do business with troubled 
entities.”106 To support the court’s presumption that Congress did not intend 
for new value to be reduced by goods for which an administrative expense 
claim is also asserted, the court noted that Congress added no provision to the 
Code prohibiting double dipping when it added § 503(b)(9).107 
Admittedly, Congress did not address double dipping when amending the 
Code in 2005. However, the court should consider that no creditor tried to 
argue for double dipping in a published case before 2005 because § 503(b)(9) 
did not exist until the 2005 amendments.108 There is no indication from the 
statute or the legislative history that Congress intended either to permit or 
prohibit double dipping. The Commissary Operations court takes an overly 
formalistic approach to a matter that likely was not contemplated by Congress. 
Rather than focusing on what Congress did not communicate in the statute, the 
court should look to what Congress did communicate by way of its policy 
goals when it enacted the statute—namely, encouraging equity among all 
creditors. 
The court’s brief policy considerations in In re Commissary Operations are 
also too broad. The court’s fears that prohibiting double dipping will create a 
strong disincentive to keep doing business with a troubled debtor are 
unfounded. Permitting double dipping would certainly give the creditor the 
best of both worlds. But prohibiting it and forcing the creditor to decide 
between being paid immediately on its administrative expense claim or 
reducing its preference liability does not encourage that creditor to stop doing 
 
 104 Id. at 878 (quoting Phx. Rest. Grp. v. Proficient Food Co. (In re Phx. Rest. Grp.), 373 B.R. 541, 548 
(M.D. Tenn. 2007)). 
 105 Id. at 879. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 1227(b), 119 Stat. 23, 200. 
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business with the troubled debtor. When a creditor receives a preference from a 
troubled debtor, it is indifferent to the decision to ship new value goods as long 
as those goods can reduce its preference liability. If it ships those goods and 
claims the subsequent new value defense, its preference liability is reduced by 
the value of those new value goods.109 If it ships the goods and claims an 
administrative expense, it is paid an amount equal to the value of those goods 
from the debtor’s estate110 and must face preference liability in the future. 
Either the new value goods are treated as any other goods would be treated in 
the subsequent new value defense or they are treated as any other goods would 
be treated under an administrative expense claim. Forcing the creditor to 
choose merely puts it on the same footing as all other creditors. These creditors 
may have administrative expense claims or subsequent new value defenses, 
with no more of a disincentive to deal with the troubled debtor than any of the 
other creditors. 
As demonstrated above, the policy goal of encouraging creditors to 
continue doing business with troubled debtors is likely unaffected by 
prohibiting double dipping. Therefore, courts should instead focus on the 
policy goal of encouraging equal treatment among creditors. In re Commissary 
Operations ignores this goal. Effectively, In re Commissary Operations gives 
creditors with goods who potentially qualify for a subsequent new value 
defense and an administrative expense claim a privileged position over other 
creditors. Additionally, the Commissary Operations court gives an advantage 
to certain creditors with no reciprocal benefit to the debtor. 
At least one commentator has argued that permitting creditor double 
dipping is permissible under the language of § 547.111 The argument relies on 
the idea that postpetition payments cannot reduce prepetition new value.112 
Section 547(c)(4)(B) says that a new value defense is only allowed if “the 
debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer” for the benefit of the 
creditor who wishes to double dip.113 Because case law has established that 
only either the debtor in possession (DIP) or the trustee can act on behalf of the 
estate, this argument asserts that we should only look to the prepetition actions 
 
 109 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (2006). 
 110 Id. § 503(b)(9). 
 111 See Mark I. Duedall, The (Adverse?) Effect of the New Administrative Claim of Section 503(b)(9) on 
Preference Actions, 2 PREFERENCE Q.L.J., Jan. 12, 2006, at 1, 9. 
 112 See id. at 5 (citing Grant v. Sun Bank (In re Thurmon Constr., Inc.), 189 B.R. 1004, 1014 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1995)). 
 113 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4)(B) (emphasis added). 
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of the debtor. Those administrative expense payments that come from the 
estate postpetition are completely separate from any subsequent new value 
prepetition. Further, cases have established that postpetition shipments of 
goods cannot enhance prepetition new value.114 Thus, a reasonable argument 
may be made that “a careful reading of § 547(c)(4)(B) shows it has no 
application to postpetition payments of any kind, which would include 
postpetition payments by a DIP of a prepetition claim entitled to priority under 
§ 503(b)(9).”115 
However, upon closer inspection, there is reason to believe that the filing 
date is not an absolute impediment between prepetition actions of the debtor 
and the postpetition actions of the DIP or trustee. Section 547(a)(2), in defining 
new value for the purposes of the section, says that new value “means money 
or money’s worth in goods, services, or new credit . . . that is neither void nor 
voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law.”116 The 
significance of “or the trustee” is that the trustee of the estate does not exist 
until after the petition has been filed. Therefore, § 547(a)(2) states that the 
trustee (which can only exist postpetition) may void prepetition new value. If 
that is the case, it would suggest that the filing of the petition is not an obstacle 
preventing interference with the debtor’s prepetition receipt of goods. 
Shortly after the decision in In re Commissary Operations, the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided TI Acquisition II.117 The 
debtor in TI Acquisition II was a textile manufacturer who had received 
$302,512 worth of manufacturing supplies from a creditor.118 In the 
bankruptcy proceeding, the creditor tried to double dip, and the debtor told the 
court that it would only allow either the administrative expense claim or the 
subsequent new value defense.119 
 
 114 See, e.g., Field v. Md. Motor Truck Ass’n (In re George Transfer, Inc.), 259 B.R. 89, 95–96 (Bankr. D. 
Md. 2001). 
 115 See Duedall, supra note 111, at 7. 
 116 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 117 TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
2010). This case was the second hearing pertaining to the dispute between Southern Polymer and TI 
Acquisition, LLC. In the first hearing, the court had disallowed a § 503(b)(9) administrative expense claim by 
the creditor. See S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 2009). 
 118 In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. at 378. 
 119 Id. at 379. 
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Unlike In re Commissary Operations, the court in TI Acquisition II 
determined that administrative expenses were similar to reclamation claims.120 
It accused the Commissary Operations court of ignoring key language in In re 
Phoenix Restaurant.121 TI Acquisition II referred to In re Phoenix Restaurant 
for the point that “[the creditor] had the right either to reclaim goods of a value 
of $540,000 or have its reclamation claim enhanced in priority over other 
creditors to that amount.”122 Further, the Phoenix Restaurant case stated, 
“Either way, [the creditor’s] reclamation claim would not add ‘new value’ to 
the debtor; as the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt put it, these goods were not ‘shipped 
free of the seller’s strings.’”123 The significance of the italicized portion of the 
above quote is that enhancing a claim in priority over other creditors is exactly 
what happens with a § 503(b)(9) administrative expense claim.124 
In re Phoenix Restaurant’s reasoning was that goods subject to a 
reclamation claim are not sold “free of the seller’s strings” because the seller 
could either reclaim the goods themselves or have a monetary claim enhanced 
in priority over other creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding.125 In the same 
way, goods shipped by a creditor to the debtor twenty days before the 
bankruptcy filing would also receive an enhanced priority over other creditors 
in the bankruptcy proceeding. Under that reasoning, TI Acquisition II correctly 
decided that goods subject to an administrative expense claim were not shipped 
free of the seller’s strings.126 But is there a significant difference between a 
§ 503(b)(9) administrative expense claim and a reclamation claim? 
1. An Administrative Expense Claim is Analogous to a Reclamation Claim 
If an administrative expense claim is analogous to a reclamation claim, it 
will significantly strengthen a party’s argument that the goods were not new 
value. This was the reasoning of the bankruptcy court in In re Phoenix 
Restaurant.127 If the creditor may reclaim or receive payment for them after the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition, the goods have not balanced out the creditor’s 
 
 120 Id. at 381. 
 121 Id.  
 122 Id. (quoting Phx. Rest. Grp. v. Proficient Food Co. (In re Phx. Rest. Grp.), 373 B.R. 541, 548 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2007)) (emphasis added by TI Acquisition court). 
 123 In re Phx. Rest. Grp., 373 B.R. at 548. 
 124 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2006). Section 507 elevates administrative expense claims to the position 
of second highest priority, above all other creditors’ claims except domestic support obligations. 
 125 In re Phx. Rest. Grp., 373 B.R. at 548. 
 126 See In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. at 381. 
 127 In re Phx. Rest. Grp., 373 B.R at 548. 
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earlier preference.128 In the same way, allowing the creditor to receive an 
administrative expense claim for the same goods it argues added new value to 
the debtor’s estate would not replenish the debtor’s estate of the property 
previously received by the creditor. It does not make sense to grant that the 
creditor added new value to the debtor’s estate and then allow the creditor to 
deplete the estate by that same amount of new value after the debtor files for 
bankruptcy protection. The nature of the subsequent new value defense and the 
§ 503(b)(9) administrative expense claim would suggest that the two are 
mutually exclusive. 
In the case of the interaction between the subsequent new value defense 
and administrative expenses, the reasoning from In re Phoenix Restaurant is 
applicable. In courts that accept the U.C.C. definition of “goods,”129 a claim for 
an administrative expense is likely to constitute a reclamation claim because, 
as In re Phoenix Restaurant noted, a reclamation claim may seek either the 
goods themselves or a prioritized monetary payment for the goods.130 When 
claiming an administrative expense, the creditor seeks payment for those 
goods; it does not seek to reclaim the goods it has shipped to the debtor.131 
A creditor might be inclined to dismiss the distinction between reclaiming 
the goods themselves and seeking payment from the estate of the debtor. 
Whether the creditor receives the goods themselves or the cash for those 
goods, the debtor’s estate is depleted by the same amount. However, the 
bankruptcy court in In re Commissary Operations focused on the fact that a 
reclamation claim may arise before the debtor files for bankruptcy, while 
administrative expense claims can only arise after the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition.132 In that case, the court focused on the creditor’s expectations when 
shipping the goods.133 With regard to a reclamation claim, the creditor knows 
at the time of shipping the goods that it can exercise its reclamation claim and 
take the goods back. However, with an administrative expense claim, the 
creditor may not know the debtor is within twenty days of filing for bankruptcy 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2004). See supra note 59 for the definition of “goods.” 
 130 In re Phx. Rest. Grp., 373 B.R at 548. 
 131 The wording of § 503(b)(9) states that an administrative expense claim is allowed only for “the value 
of any goods received by the debtor” rather than the creditor being able to reclaim the goods themselves. 11 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 132 Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 873, 
877 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
 133 Id.  
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and thus, at the time of shipping, has no idea that he will have a cognizable 
claim against the estate. 
Additionally, the court in In re Commissary Operations noted that the 
creditor might not even receive its full claim for an administrative expense the 
way it would via a reclamation claim because, while administrative expenses 
receive the second highest priority of unsecured creditors, they still may not 
recover the full value of its goods after the secured creditors and domestic 
support obligations are satisfied.134 Further, the bankruptcy court also might 
not approve the administrative expense claim.135 
The court in In re Commissary Operations also focused briefly on the 
policy behind §§ 503(b)(9) and 547(c)(4).136 The policy considerations made 
by Congress were to encourage creditors to continue doing business with 
distressed debtors.137 The court briefly touched on a formalistic approach to the 
statute at the end of its opinion, noting: 
Congress did not amend 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) to include a new 
subsection reducing new value by the amount of any § 503(b)(9) 
claim. There is nothing in the plain language of [either section] that 
indicates any [c]ongressional intent to offset the intended benefits 
that 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) confers upon sellers through a reduction of 
available new value in defending a preference action.138 
While it is true that Congress did not amend § 547(c)(4) to deal with new 
value reductions as a result of its addition of § 503(b)(9), that is hardly 
indicative of Congress’s intent on this matter. An argument that Congress did 
not intend § 503(b)(9) to reduce a § 547(c)(4) new value defense because it did 
not amend § 547(c)(4) with the 2005 amendments might be less convincing, 
however, when one remembers that the argument presented in In re 
Commissary Operations was an issue of first impression.139 It is difficult to 
take Congress’s silence on the issue to be tacit approval of an argument that 
 
 134 Id. at 877–78. 
 135 Id. at 878. 
 136 Id. at 879; see also Courts Continue to Strengthen the “New Value” Defense, NEIGER LLP, 
http://www.neigerllp.com/avoidance-action-report/courts-continue-to-strengthen-the-%E2%80%9Cnew-value 
%E2%80%9D-defense (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 137 See In re Commissary Operations, 421 B.R. at 877 (citing Phx. Rest. Grp. v. Proficient Food Co. (In re 
Phx. Rest. Grp.), 373 B.R. 541, 547 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Arts Dairy, LLC, 414 B.R. 219, 220 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 2009)). 
 138 In re Commissary Operations, 421 B.R. at 879. 
 139 See id. at 876. 
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had never been used before. The more likely explanation is that Congress 
simply did not consider the question when enacting the amendments. 
The reasoning of In re Commissary Operations is, however, completely at 
odds with that of TI Acquisition II. On whether administrative expense claims 
are comparable to reclamation claims, the court in TI Acquisition II held that 
administrative expense claims are similar to reclamation claims, based largely 
on a functionalist line of reasoning. Primarily, the court reasoned that the 
determinative fact was that both reclamation claims and administrative expense 
claims deprive the debtor of the “uninhibited use of new value.”140 
TI Acquisition II could be limited to its facts. The creditor’s administrative 
expense was fully protected by a fund set aside by the estate.141 Thus, the court 
reasoned, while there is normally a substantial difference between the right to 
reclamation and the right to an administrative expense, there was no difference 
in this particular case because of the reserve fund.142 Under the court’s 
reasoning, the creditor would be indifferent as to which it got if it had both an 
administrative expense claim and a reclamation claim on account of the reserve 
fund.143 While the opinion seems broad enough to apply to many different 
factual settings, a creditor might try to distinguish its case from TI Acquisition 
II if no such reserve fund existed and there was a fear of administrative 
insolvency. 
B. Jurisdictional Obstacles to Double Dipping: The “Remains Unpaid” 
Approach and the “Subsequent Advance” Approach 
TI Acquisition II noted that the timing of a § 503(b)(9) claim affects 
whether double dipping is an available argument.144 There are two different 
approaches that circuit courts have followed when examining whether goods 
that constitute new value must remain unpaid: (1) the “remains unpaid” 
approach, and (2) the “subsequent advance” approach.145 The TI Acquisition II 
court believed that both approaches could be used to prevent double dipping,146 
 
 140 TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377, 384 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2010). 
 141 Id. at 385. 
 142 Id. at 381. 
 143 Id.  
 144 See id. at 383–84. 
 145 See id. at 382–83. 
 146 See id. at 383–84. If the Eleventh Circuit were to fully embrace the remains unpaid approach, it is clear 
that the postpetition payment of SPI’s § 503(b)(9) claim would deplete SPI’s new value defense. Under the 
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but the argument is less straightforward with the “subsequent advance” 
approach. 
1. Two Different Approaches to Whether Subsequent New Value May Be 
Paid and Still Claimed as an Administrative Expense 
A corollary to the jurisdictional arguments between the “remains unpaid” 
and “subsequent advance” approaches is to argue that §§ 503(b)(9) and 
547(c)(4) are inapplicable on the grounds that § 547(c)(4)(B) requires that the 
“debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of 
such creditor.”147 Timing becomes the main issue because it might make a 
difference whether the debtor has already paid the administrative expense 
claim under § 503(b)(9) when the subsequent new value defense of § 547(c)(4) 
is raised. In other words, does the payment of the administrative expense claim 
to the creditor count as “an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit 
of such creditor”? If so, it would seem that upon receipt of payment, that 
creditor would no longer be able to use the subsequent new value defense to 
keep a preference. 
There is a split in the courts as to whether the new value must remain 
unpaid for the creditor to use it as a defense against disgorging the 
preference.148 One side requires that it remain unpaid, and the other focuses on 
whether the preference was paid by an otherwise unavoidable transfer.149 The 
approach of the former jurisdictions is aptly named the “remains unpaid” 
approach, while the approach of the latter jurisdictions is known as the 
“subsequent advance” approach.150 
a. The “Remains Unpaid” Approach 
The “remains unpaid” approach has three requirements: (1) the creditor 
must give unsecured new value; (2) the debtor must receive the new value after 
the preferential transfer at issue; and (3) the debtor must not have repaid the 
 
“subsequent advance” approach, the reasoning in In re Phoenix Restaurant still supports treating fully funded 
§ 503(b)(9) claims like reclamation claims and unlike critical vendor payments because § 503(b)(9) claims 
deny the debtor and the debtor’s estate the uninhibited use of new value. 
 147 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4)(B) (2006). 
 148 4 NORTON, supra note 43, § 66:36, at 66-169. 
 149 Id. § 66:36, at 66-169 to -170. 
 150 See Leslie Treff, Commentary on the Ability of Creditor to Offset Preferential Transfers by New Value, 
2010 LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 4922, at 3–4 (2010). 
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new value.151 In these jurisdictions it would seem that the third requirement 
may prevent a creditor from both using a subsequent new value defense and 
making a claim for administrative expenses under § 503(b)(9). The creditor, in 
being paid for its administrative expense claim, would have to forgo keeping 
its preferential payments through the subsequent new value defense. At least 
one commentator regards the “remains unpaid” approach as the controlling law 
in the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.152 
In a “remains unpaid” jurisdiction, the argument to ban double dipping is 
easier.153 Paying the § 503(b)(9) claim for new value goods would violate the 
requirement that the payment for those goods remains unpaid. If a creditor 
receives payment for its new value goods, the debtor has not benefitted from 
any new value. 
b. The “Subsequent Advance” (TI Acquisition II) Approach 
The “subsequent advance” approach renders certain transfers not 
preferential even though no goods were exchanged during the preference 
period. Specifically, the “subsequent advance” approach is as follows: 
When, for goods sold and delivered, payments are made on a running 
or open account between the parties in the regular course of business 
within the 90-day period, without knowledge on the part of the 
creditor of the debtor’s insolvency, and the net result of this 
transaction is to enrich the debtor’s estate by the total sales, less the 
total payment, such payments or transfers are not preferential, even 
though no corresponding goods are exchanged for the payments 
made within the preference period.154 
The gist of this approach is simply that the new value may not have been 
secured by or paid for by an unavoidable transfer.155 
 
 151 Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. Cont’l Constr. Eng’rs, Inc. (In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 930 F.2d 648, 652 (8th 
Cir. 1991); see also N.Y.C. Shoes, Inc. v. Bentley Int’l, Inc. (In re N.Y.C. Shoes, Inc.), 880 F.2d 679, 680 (3d 
Cir. 1989); Charisma Inv. Co. v. Airport Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Fla. Sys., Inc.), 841 F.2d 1082, 1083 (11th Cir. 
1988). 
 152 See Treff, supra note 150, at 1. 
 153 See TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377, 384 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 2010) (“If the Eleventh Circuit were to fully embrace the remains unpaid approach, it is clear that the 
post-petition payment of [the creditor’s] § 503(b)(9) claim would deplete [the creditor’s] new value defense.”). 
 154 5 COLLIER, supra note 32, ¶ 547.04[4][d]. 
 155 In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. at 383. 
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The “subsequent advance” approach opens the door to double dipping and 
hinges on whether a § 503(b)(9) claim arises prepetition or postpetition.156 The 
reasoning is that § 547, governing preferences, closes the window for new 
value shipments on the date of the bankruptcy filing.157 Thus, § 503(b)(9) 
administrative expense claims, which are paid postpetition, arguably could not 
be used to deplete prepetition new value. 
However, as argued earlier in this Comment,158 the substance of 
§ 503(b)(9) administrative expense claims arise prepetition.159 They should be 
treated as prepetition contingent claims. The goods at issue in a § 503(b)(9) 
claim are shipped twenty days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition and 
are paid priority with other administrative expenses.160 Under the “subsequent 
advance” approach, treating § 503(b)(9) goods as prepetition contingent claims 
would make them analogous to reclamation claims. Thus, a party challenging 
double dipping would have a colorable argument that the new value was 
depleted by the payment of the § 503(b)(9) claim.161 
The resolution of these two conflicting views may lie in the Code itself.162 
Section 547(c)(4)(B) places emphasis on the avoidability of the debtor’s 
subsequent payments and not on whether the new value was actually unpaid.163 
If the matter does not revolve around whether the new value will eventually be 
repaid, it would seem that § 503(b)(9) and the existence of an administrative 
expense claim would have no bearing on whether a creditor may successfully 
assert a subsequent new value defense.164 
 
 156 See Phx. Rest. Grp. v. Proficient Food Co. (In re Phx. Rest. Grp.), 373 B.R. 541, 547 (M.D. Tenn. 
2007) (“The [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt reasoned that the preference window of § 547 closed on the date of the filing 
of the bankruptcy petition and post-petition payments could not be used to deplete pre-petition ‘new value.’”). 
 157 Id. 
 158 See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 159 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006); S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, 
LLC), 410 B.R. 742, 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 160 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). 
 161 See, e.g., TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377, 384 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (“Under the subsequent advance approach, the reasoning in In re Phoenix Restaurant 
Group still supports treating fully funded § 503(b)(9) claims like reclamation claims and unlike critical vendor 
payments because § 503(b)(9) claims deny the debtor and the debtor’s estate the uninhibited use of new 
value.”). 
 162 4 NORTON, supra note 43, § 66:36, at 66-170. 
 163 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4)(B). 
 164 4 NORTON, supra note 43, § 66:36, at 66-170 to -171. (citing Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot 
Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 873 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010)). But see In re TI 
Acquisition, 429 B.R. 377. 
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The TI Acquisition II court also questioned the notion that the Eleventh 
Circuit was a jurisdiction that ascribed to the reasoning that the new value must 
remain unpaid in order to use the subsequent new value defense.165 While it 
did not deny that the previous Eleventh Circuit case of In re Jet Florida 
Systems had listed “the new value must remain unpaid” in its list of 
requirements to utilize the subsequent new value defense in 1988, it noted that 
§ 547(c)(4)(B) was not directly in dispute in the case and thus treated the 
statements of the Eleventh Circuit in In re Jet Florida as dicta.166 While the 
court was correct in noting that § 547(c)(4)(B) never specifically came up in 
the Jet Florida case, the matter at issue does revolve around a legal 
interpretation of § 547(c)(4).167 While the facts of the Jet Florida case show 
that the new value at issue in that case remained unpaid and the court listed 
that new value “remain unpaid” when it listed the requirements, it did not go 
into any further analysis of the issue.168 
Nonetheless, contrary to the statement of the bankruptcy court in TI 
Acquisition II, other commentators regard the Eleventh Circuit as a jurisdiction 
that follows the “remains unpaid” requirement for determining the applicability 
of the subsequent new value defense.169 Given the infrequency with which 
preference actions are litigated, and thus the exceedingly rare occasions on 
which the federal appellate courts have the opportunity to review that body of 
case law, it may be some time before it is clear whether In re Jet Florida is 
good precedent for the proposition that the Eleventh Circuit is a “remains 
unpaid” jurisdiction. 
The TI Acquisition II court is not the first bankruptcy court to distinguish 
between a present case and other precedential decisions in the same 
jurisdiction by appealing to the fact that the earlier court did not specifically 
address § 547(c)(4)(B). In 2009, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware made essentially the same argument to distinguish its precedent.170 
In In re Pillowtex Corp., the bankruptcy court addressed the third requirement 
 
 165 In re TI Acquisition, 429 B.R. at 383–84. 
 166 Id. (quoting Charisma Inv. Co. v. Airport Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Fla. Sys., Inc.), 841 F.2d 1082, 1083 
(11th Cir. 1988)). 
 167 In re Jet Fla. Sys., 841 F.2d at 1083. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See, e.g., Treff, supra note 150, at 1 (“Section 547(c)(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code has been 
interpreted by the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits to require that ‘new value’ remain unpaid at the end of 
the preference period to be used by a creditor to offset its preference liability.”). 
 170 See Wahoski v. Am. & Efrid, Inc. (In re Pillowtex Corp.), 416 B.R. 123, 128–29 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2009). 
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of the subsequent new value defense. The court determined that it could 
distinguish between two earlier cases that had placed the District of Delaware 
within the “remains unpaid” approach.171 Though neither of the two earlier 
cases was a circuit court case as in TI Acquisition II, one was a district court 
decision.172 Similar to the reasoning of the court in TI Acquisition II, the 
Pillowtex court concluded that “neither [of the two earlier] court[s] analyzed 
the third element of the test, but considered only whether the creditor had 
provided new value after receipt of a preferential transfer.”173 On that basis, 
the court determined that it could examine § 547(c)(4)(B) independently of In 
re Jet Florida.174 
If the TI Acquisition II court is correct in its reading of Eleventh Circuit 
precedent and its reasoning stands, the decision could act as a total bar to those 
wishing to assert the same new value goods for a subsequent new value 
defense and an administrative expense claim. Both TI Acquisition II175 and 
Pillowtex176 offer a potential solution to those who wish to bar double dipping. 
This would give bankruptcy courts substantial power to shape §§ 547(c)(4) and 
503(b)(9) jurisprudence. Given the infrequency with which the circuit courts of 
appeal examine bankruptcy cases, there could be a substantial amount of lower 
bankruptcy court precedent placing grassroots pressure on the circuit courts 
when the issue finally reaches them. 
2. Perverse Incentives Created by Allowing Double Dipping 
While the bankruptcy court in In re Commissary Operations examined the 
policy considerations of Congress and the incentives that its interpretation 
would create for creditors, it did not consider any adverse incentives that its 
ruling might create for debtors. 
A debtor may wish to “load up” on goods from its suppliers on the eve of 
bankruptcy in an effort to keep its business running through a likely chapter 11 
 
 171 See id. 
 172 See Claybrook v. Pizza Hut, Inc. (In re Discovery Zone, Inc.), No. 99-0941 (PJW), 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20575 (D. Del. Oct. 5, 2004). 
 173 See In re Pillowtex Corp., 416 B.R. at 128–29. 
 174 See id. 
 175 TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
2010). 
 176 In re Pillowtex Corp., 416 B.R. 123. 
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reorganization.177 But what other motivation could a debtor have for stocking 
up on inventory just before bankruptcy? 
Insight into the buyer-supplier relationship of businesses helps to answer 
that question. Loyalty to suppliers who are sympathetic to your business can 
advantage buyers. Experts advise businesses to build “familial ties” with their 
suppliers and work together on long-term partnerships.178 
Loyalty, “familial ties,” and long-term partnerships may lead to a debtor 
favoring its suppliers over its other creditors. The supplier is similar to an 
equity investor in some respects.179 It is often owed too small an amount of 
money to make direct participation in the bankruptcy litigation worthwhile, 
and thus, like equity holders in a business, the supplier often receives nothing 
at the end of a bankruptcy.180 Despite this seemingly precarious position, the 
supplier is not without the means to induce payment from the debtor. Debtors 
in possession wishing to continue the business as a going concern understand 
that a supplier can often ensure that it gets paid by threatening to withhold 
future deliveries.181 Thus, a debtor approaching bankruptcy must decide what it 
is willing to do to keep its suppliers satisfied.182 In the debtor’s mind, the 
desire to maintain a favorable business reputation with industry suppliers may 
trump the desire to be equitable with all of its creditors. 
The implication of the In re Commissary Operations decision allowing for 
double dipping creates a new tool for the savvy debtor. For example, if a 
debtor wants to ensure that a favored supplier will keep any money it has 
received as a preference, on the eve of bankruptcy, it may order from the 
supplier an amount of goods equal to the preference. This incentive could be 
even greater where the debtor is a small business and the favored supplier is a 
friend or family member. After declaring bankruptcy, the debtor would then 
inform the creditor that it should make both the §§ 547(c)(4) and 503(b)(9) 
claims in order to keep both its preference and receive priority payment via an 
 
 177 Bob Eisenbach, Reclamation: Can a Vendor “Get the Goods” from an Insolvent Customer?, IN THE 
(RED): THE BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Nov. 19, 2006), http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2006/11/articles/ 
business-bankruptcy-issues/reclamation-can-a-vendor-get-the-goods-from-an-insolvent-customer. 
 178 See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Liker & Thomas Y. Choi, Building Deep Supplier Relationships, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Dec. 2004, at 104, 106. 
 179 Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the “Opt Out” Problem, 72 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 913, 923 (1994). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith, Must Suppliers Continue To Supply on Credit During the Slide into 
Bankruptcy? Heck No!, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2009, at 26, 26. 
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administrative expense claim for its goods. Using this strategy, the debtor may 
ensure that a favored creditor receives full payment of its claims ahead of all 
other unsecured creditors. 
If the In re Commissary Operations case stands, the impact of the holding 
is difficult to predict. Debt owed to a supplier is often very small in relation to 
debt owed to all other creditors.183 However, the claim for administrative 
expenses can sometimes be substantial. For example, in TI Acquisition I and TI 
Acquisition II, the creditor’s total administrative expense claim amounted to 
$302,512.00.184 Additionally, the debtor would need significant knowledge of 
the Code in order to manufacture an opportunity to double dip for a creditor. 
Companies that have been through bankruptcy before or consult a bankruptcy 
attorney before filing their petition may obtain the knowledge necessary to 
manage their supplier business relationship by helping double dip under the 
reasoning of In re Commissary Operations. It may seem that debtors only 
rarely manufacture an opportunity for favored creditors to double dip, but if 
other bankruptcy courts accept the reasoning of In re Commissary Operations, 
double dipping may become standard business practice. 
Feelings of loyalty, charity, and concern for its business reputation might 
not be the only reasons that a debtor will structure its payments and bankruptcy 
to protect its suppliers. Firms often enjoy discretionary lines of credit with their 
suppliers as a cushion against adverse business effects in difficult economic 
times.185 For debtors in high risk industries, suppliers can be a source of capital 
financing.186 Suppliers extend trade credit to businesses that demonstrate that 
they are safe credit risks.187 Once the potential for risk analysis and credit 
extensions are open for negotiation, suppliers and debtors can begin to bargain 
over the terms of those credit extensions. Debtors who have low credit scores 
or operate high-risk business ventures can offer under-the-table agreements to 
suppliers which include favorable treatment for that supplier on the eve of 
bankruptcy. Even when a business is not organized between close personal 
friends and family members, management has incentives to personalize 
 
 183 Baird, supra note 179, at 923. 
 184 S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742, 745 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2009). It is unclear from the opinion how much of the claim specifically fell under § 503(b)(9). 
 185 Baird, supra note 179, at 922. 
 186 Capital Sources for Your Business, UNIV. ME. COOP. EXTENSION PUBL’NS, http://umaine.edu/ 
publications/3008e (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 187 Trade credit is an agreement between two businesses that one will buy goods from the other on 
account. Trade Credit, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/term/82538.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
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business relationships, especially those with their suppliers.188 Suppliers, 
unlike banks that may only provide one-time financing, are creditors that 
maintain regular contact with the business. Often, businesses will feel a strong 
sense of commitment to their suppliers.189 
Businesses will feel a need to keep their suppliers informed of their long-
term plans.190 Some consulting groups encourage businesses to treat their 
suppliers as partners rather than as just vendors.191 They encourage businesses 
to “engage in . . . forward planning” with their suppliers so that both parties 
will feel comfortable.192 All of this regular contact and personal interaction 
will lead businesses to view their relationship with certain suppliers as 
personal—not just economic. 
In re Commissary Operations may provide just the legal tool a debtor 
needs to protect its supplier relationships in bankruptcy.193 If the reasoning of 
In re Commissary Operations holds, the debtor’s attorney could advise the 
debtor to order an amount of goods from the supplier’s business equal to the 
amount of the preference the supplier holds. The supplier will then be capable 
of arguing that those goods shipped on the eve of bankruptcy constitute both 
subsequent new value and an administrative expense. The debtor’s estate will 
be depleted in the amount of the administrative expense to the detriment of its 
other creditors, but its business reputation and personal relationship with its 
favored supplier may remain intact. 
3. Mitigating Perverse Incentives 
If a creditor suspects that a debtor ordered goods from its supplier on the 
eve of bankruptcy to protect that supplier’s preference by allowing it to double 
dip, there is an additional option available to challenge the substance of the 
administrative expense claim. Section 503(b)(9) requires that any goods for 
which a creditor seeks an administrative expense claim be sold “in the ordinary 
 
 188 Bob Reiss, Build a Good Relationship with Suppliers, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/ 
management/growingyourbusiness/article205868.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (advising management to 
“personalize the relationship” with their suppliers by visiting their offices, “invit[ing] them to break bread,” 
“invit[ing] them to . . . [company] picnics,” and “includ[ing] them in . . . strategy meetings”). 
 189 Supplier Relationships, EPIQ, http://www.epiqtech.com/supplier_relationship_management.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See, e.g., id. 
 192 See, e.g., id. 
 193 See Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 
873 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
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course of . . . business.”194 Under the U.C.C., a “[b]uyer in ordinary course of 
business” is “a person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that 
the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary 
course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods 
of that kind.”195 Thus, if a creditor suspects that the debtor is stocking up on 
goods right before bankruptcy, it may challenge those purchases on the 
grounds that they were not purchased in the ordinary course of business. 
Courts use two tests to determine whether a transaction occurred in the 
ordinary course of business.196 The first test is known as the horizontal test and 
involves comparing the transaction at issue to similar transactions across the 
industry.197 If the sale does not comport with what other similarly situated 
businesses would do in similar situations, the transaction will fail the 
horizontal test.198 
The second test is known as the vertical test (also called the “creditor 
expectation test”) and involves comparing the sale at issue with previous sales 
made by the debtor.199 If the sale is too dissimilar to other sales that the 
business made prior to the preference period, it will fail the vertical test. 
Those courts that do not use both tests will employ the vertical test 
alone.200 The horizontal test “has been criticized on statutory construction 
grounds as . . . redundant . . . and difficult to apply.”201 Nevertheless, some 
jurisdictions still apply it.202 
A debtor trying to stock up on goods on the eve of bankruptcy might leave 
indicia that the sale was not in the ordinary course of business. There is also a 
possibility that a party wishing to challenge the administrative expense claim 
of another party could argue that the goods were not sold in good faith because 
 
 194 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006). 
 195 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D DICTIONARY OF 
BANKRUPTCY TERMS O30 (2012) (citing U.C.C. § 2-201(b)(9)). 
 196 Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 704–06 (9th Cir. 
1988). But see In re Ockerlund Constr. Co., 308 B.R. 325, 328–29 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (rejecting the need 
to employ the horizontal test and applying only the vertical test). 
 197 In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 704. Note that this definition of “ordinary course of business” came 
about seventeen years before the 2005 amendments, which created § 503(b)(9). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 705. 
 200 See In re Ockerlund Constr., 308 B.R. at 328–29.; In re Husting Land and Dev., Inc., 255 B.R. 772, 
779–80 (Bankr. D. Utah 2000). 
 201 In re Husting Land and Dev., 255 B.R. at 779. 
 202 See, e.g., In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 704. 
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they were sold with “knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another 
person.”203 The debtor ordering significantly larger amounts of a particular 
good from a supplier than it has in the past, ordering a different or more 
expensive type of good than it normally does, or significantly changing the 
shipping terms for the goods may constitute evidence that the sale was not 
performed in the ordinary course of business. 
However, a business on the cusp of filing a bankruptcy petition is not 
operating in the normal course of business. A criticism of both the vertical and 
horizontal tests is that a company in financial distress should not have its 
transactions scrutinized by courts in comparison to other businesses in the 
industry that might not be in financial distress. Perhaps transactions that do not 
meet the vertical test should only carry a rebuttable presumption that they are 
not in the ordinary course of business. It might be advantageous to jurisdictions 
outside the Ninth Circuit to adopt the reasoning of In re Dant & Russell204 with 
a caveat: to the extent certain transactions might not be in line with industry 
practices, businesses will have the opportunity to give arguments as to why the 
transaction really is in good faith and the ordinary course of business, even if 
other businesses across the industry would not engage in the same transactions. 
4. Section 502(d) as a Solution to the Double Dipping Problem 
If a creditor is unable to convince the court that the reasoning under In re 
Phoenix Restaurants and TI Acquisition II is correct, it should look to § 502(d) 
of the Code and try to disallow the administrative expense claim until the 
preference is repaid to the estate.205 Precedent in a district or an unwillingness 
to confront the issue of double dipping might prevent a court from adopting the 
logic of TI Acquisition II. Yet when confronted with a creditor who wishes to 
use the same goods for a subsequent new value defense, as well as for an 
administrative expense claim, the bankruptcy court can apply this argument as 
an “out.” 
 
 203 NORTON, supra note 195, at O30. 
 204 In re Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 704. This case focuses on the horizontal and vertical tests and 
describes the jurisdictional splits in how they are applied. However, this Comment suggests that while the 
horizontal and vertical tests are good starting points, a distressed business which may need to engage in 
abnormal business transactions for the purpose of its own economic survival should have the opportunity to 
explain why its transactions were made in good faith, even if such transactions do not technically pass the 
horizontal and vertical tests. 
 205 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2006). 
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Courts are split as to whether § 502(d) can be applied in this way.206 The 
bankruptcy court in In re Circuit City dealt with the interplay between 
§§ 501(a), 502(d), and 503(b)(9).207 The Circuit City court held that § 502(d) 
could disallow an administrative expense claim.208 On the other hand, the 
bankruptcy court in TI Acquisition I held that § 502(d) did not apply to 
administrative expense claims.209 
a. The TI Acquisition I Approach 
In 2009, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided 
TI Acquisition I, holding that § 502(d) could not disallow administrative 
expense claims filed pursuant to § 503(b)(9).210 The debtor in that case sought 
to disallow a $302,512 claim filed by its creditors.211 
In denying the applicability of § 502(d), the court looked at the fact that the 
statute had not been amended in 2005 when § 503(b)(9) was added to make 
§ 502(d) disallowance applicable.212 The court reasoned that § 503(b)(9) 
claims were administrative expenses and not prepetition claims.213 It held that 
§ 502(d) was applicable only to those claims governed by § 501.214 
The opinion tries to make sense of an ambiguous section of the Code. 
Section 503(b)(9) is an anomaly in the sense that all other § 503(b) claims stem 
 
 206 Compare In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (determining that 
§ 502(d) may be used to disallow a § 503(b)(9) claim), with ASM Capital, LP v. Ames Dep’t Stores (In re 
Ames Dep’t Stores), 582 F.3d 422 (2d Cir. 2009), and S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI 
Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009) (both holding that § 502(d) may not disallow a 
§ 503(b)(9) claim). 
 207 In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 571. Section 501(a) states simply that “[a] creditor or an 
indenture trustee may file a proof of claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 501(a). Section 502(d) says, “[T]he court shall 
disallow any claim of any entity . . . that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under [§] . . . 547 . . . unless 
such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for which such entity or 
transferee is liable . . . .” Id. § 502(d). 
 208 In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 571. 
 209 In re TI Acquisition, 410 B.R. at 751. Though the court in this case refused to disallow the 
administrative expense claim, it postponed payment of the claim until the creditor’s actual liability was 
determined at a later date. Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 745. 
 212 See id. at 745–46. “Section 502(d) does not contain any language or reference which would make it 
applicable to administrative expenses of any kind.” Id. at 750. 
 213 Id. at 749 (“[T]he claim asserted by [the creditor] is an administrative claim, not a pre-petition 
claim.”). 
 214 Id. at 750 (“[Section] 502(d) . . . applies only to those pre- and post-petition claims that are governed 
by § 501.”). 
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from activities that only arise postpetition.215 Because § 503(b)(9) was inserted 
in the 2005 Code amendments without comment from the legislature, the TI 
Acquisition I court, relying on an earlier case,216 reasoned that § 502(d) applies 
only to those claims governed by §§ 501 and 502.217 Section 502(a) begins, “A 
claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is 
deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.”218 The language of 
§ 502(a) seems to suggest that all claims filed pursuant to § 501 are 
immediately allowed, without any other preconditions, unless a party objects. 
Section 503(b), however, says, “After notice and a hearing, there shall be 
allowed administrative expenses . . . .”219 Thus, §§ 502(a) and 503(b) seem to 
have different requirements that must be met before any claims filed pursuant 
to either are allowed. But does that mean that the two sections are mutually 
exclusive? 
The Circuit City court determined that nothing in the Code suggests that 
§§ 501, 502, and 503 are mutually exclusive.220 The applicability of § 502(d) 
to § 503(b)(9) claimants can be understood in six pieces: (1) as § 503(b)(9) 
claimants are creditors,221 (2) they must follow the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 3002222 and (3) file their claims pursuant to § 501(a);223 
(4) they thereby comply with Rule 3002(a) and, in doing so, simultaneously 
comply with § 501(a), (5) making those claims governed by § 502(a) and (d), 
and (6) allowing § 502(d) to disallow those § 503(b)(9) claims. Contrary to the 
reasoning of TI Acquisition I, methodical contemplation of the sections at hand 




 215 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)–(8) (2006), with id. § 503(b)(9). 
 216 See In re Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc., 394 B.R. 147, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (“[Section] 
502(d) does apply to post-petition claims, but only to those post-petition claims that are governed by § 501 and 
§ 502.”) 
 217 In re TI Acquisition, 410 B.R. at 750 (citing In re Plastech Engineered Prods., 394 B.R. at 161). 
 218 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). 
 219 Id. § 503(b) (emphasis added). 
 220 In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). 
 221 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). 
 222 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002. 
 223 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“A creditor . . . may file a proof of claim.”). 
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The TI Acquisition I court should have focused on the substance of the 
§ 503(b)(9) claim rather than its classification as an administrative expense. In 
fact, focusing solely on its classification led the court to awkward treatment of 
§ 503(b)(9) claims. For example, the court noted that “the claim asserted by 
[the creditor] is an administrative claim, not a prepetition claim.”224 One page 
later, however, the court says, “Although an administrative expense under 
§ 503(b)(9) is for a prepetition debt, its prepetition nature does not dictate that 
§ 503(b)(9) expenses should be treated differently than other § 503(b) 
expenses.”225 In other words, even though the substance of a § 503(b)(9) claim 
arises prepetition, it should be treated as if it arose postpetition to ensure 
uniformity within § 503(b).226 While uniformity is an important goal, the TI 
Acquisition I court discourages the uniformity of prepetition claim treatment 
throughout the Code by insisting that § 503(b)(9), though substantively 
prepetition, should be treated as if it arose postpetition. 
 
 224 S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742, 749 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2009). 
 225 Id. at 750. 
 226 With the exception of § 503(b)(9), all other § 503(b) administrative expense claims arise from activity 





Creditors must file 
proofs of claims 
under Rule 3002(a). 
§ 501(a) allows 
creditors to file a 
proof of claim. 







§ 502(a) requires a creditor 
to file a proof of claim 
under § 501 for the rest of 
§ 502 to be applicable. 





§§ 501(a) and 
502(a). 
Therefore, 
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b. The Circuit City Approach (An In-Depth Look at Chart 2) 
In In re Circuit City, the debtor filed objections to the creditors’ 
§ 503(b)(9) administrative expense claims on the grounds that those claims 
should be disallowed pursuant to § 502(d) until the creditors repaid all of their 
preferences.227 The court noted that at least one treatise says that “[the § 503 
caption] ‘allowance of administrative expenses’ . . . appears to suggest that 
§ 503 is a separate allowance section, apart from § 502, devoted exclusively to 
administrative expenses. If so, then § 502 would not apply to the allowance of 
administrative expenses.”228 However, the court rejected that reasoning and 
determined that § 502(d) could disallow an administrative expense claim.229 
The Circuit City court reasoned in pari materia230and looked to Rules 
3002231 and 3003232 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to 
determine that both rules require creditors to file proof of claims pursuant to 
§ 501(a).233 
Because § 502(d) permits disallowance of a claim by a creditor unless it 
gives any transfer it has received back to the estate, and a “creditor” is defined 
under § 101(10)(A) as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose 
at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor,” the matter 
hinges on whether § 503(b)(9) claimants are creditors.234 In the entire list of 
administrative expense claims, only § 503(b)(9) is a claim that arises before or 
 
 227 In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 564–65 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). It should be noted that 
this case deals with temporary disallowance under § 502(d) and not permanent disallowance. The creditors do 
not lose their § 503(b)(9) claims if the court disallows them; the claims are merely suspended until the 
creditors repay preferences to the debtor’s estate. 
 228 Id. at 576 (quoting 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 42:16, 
at 42-91 (2007)). 
 229 Id. at 579. 
 230 “[A] canon of construction that statutes that [relate to the same matter] may be construed together, so 
that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 807. 
 231 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a) (“An unsecured creditor or an equity security holder must file a proof of 
claim or interest for the claim or interest to be allowed . . . .”). 
 232 Id. 3003(c)(2) (“Who must file. Any creditor or equity security holder whose claim or interest is not 
scheduled or scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated shall file a proof of claim or interest within the 
time prescribed by subdivision (c)(3) of this rule; any creditor who fails to do so shall not be treated as a 
creditor with respect to such claim for the purposes of voting and distribution.”). 
 233 In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 574. The court reasoned that a § 503(b)(9) claimant constituted 
was a “creditor” under § 101(10)(A). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2006). 
 234 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (emphasis added). 
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at the time of the bankruptcy petition filing.235 Because § 503(b)(9) creates a 
claim for prepetition goods shipped to the debtor within twenty days prior to 
filing of the bankruptcy petition, it is unclear as to when an administrative 
expense claim actually becomes a claim. 
The conflict as to the timing of when § 503(b)(9) creditors actually have 
claims should be decided by looking at the substance of a § 503(b)(9) claim. 
The substance of a § 503(b)(9) claim is based on goods that are shipped 
prepetition.236 Because the goods that make up the claims arise prepetition and 
the claims are contingent upon when the debtor files for bankruptcy, this 
Comment argues237 that courts should treat them as prepetition contingent 
claims. Treated as prepetition, the issue of whether a § 503(b)(9) 
administrative expense claimant is a creditor for purposes of § 101(10)(A) 
disappears.238 As prepetition claims, the claimant would meet § 101(10)(A)’s 
definition of “creditor”: “[an] entity that has a claim against the debtor that 
arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.”239 
Even after the Circuit City court reasoned that § 503(b)(9) claimants meet 
the definition of a “creditor,”240 the court still had to determine whether 
§ 502(d) could be used to disallow the administrative expense in an effort to 
coerce the creditor into disgorging a preference under § 547.241 
The connection between §§ 502(d) and 547(c)(4) made by the Circuit City 
court may draw criticism. A potential weakness in the applicability of the 
Circuit City court’s reasoning to future cases is that the precise legal issue in In 
re Circuit City was “whether § 502(d) can be applied as a matter of law to 
temporarily disallow § 503(b)(9) claims in the amount potentially recoverable 
as a preferential transfer under § 547.”242 The court also noted that “a 
[c]laimant will be both seeking an administrative expense payment for 
goods . . . and using the delivery of those same goods as a basis for the new 
 
 235 See, e.g., id. § 503(b)(4) (allowing as an administrative expense claim “reasonable compensation for 
professional services rendered by an attorney or an accountant”). 
 236 See id. § 503(b)(9). 
 237 See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 238 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). 
 239 Id. (emphasis added). 
 240 In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). The Circuit City court also 
looked to § 101(5)(A) to determine if § 503(b)(9) claims met the definition of “claim” in the Code. The Circuit 
City court made short work of the issue, noting that the words “claim” and “expense” are used interchangeably 
throughout the Code. Id. at 568–69. 
 241 See 11 U.S.C. § 547. 
 242 In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 566 (emphasis added). 
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value defense.”243 This dual use of § 503(b)(9) goods by claimants leads to 
confusion regarding the applicability § 502(d): if a creditor claims that it does 
not have to disgorge a preference under § 547(b) because it can use the 
subsequent new value defense under § 547(c)(4), is that preference “potentially 
recoverable”? The subsequent new value defense is listed in § 547(c)(4) as a 
transfer that the trustee may not recover.244 The court employs the modifier 
“potentially,”245 perhaps suggesting that the recoverability of the preference 
must be in dispute between the parties in order for the reasoning of In re 
Circuit City to apply. While the holding of In re Circuit City may be 
interpreted as limited to those situations where there is pending litigation 
regarding the preferences paid to the creditor using the subsequent new value 
defense, the Circuit City court itself drew no particular emphasis to the word 
“potentially” in its opinion.246 
Another weakness in the Circuit City court’s reasoning lies in a potential 
conflict between the plain language of § 503 and Rule 3002.247 The creditor in 
In re Circuit City argued that requiring administrative expenses to be filed in 
accordance with § 501(a) and then disallowing those administrative expenses 
with § 502(d) would violate the plain language of § 503.248 Section 503(b) 
states, “After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative 
expenses.”249 The mandatory language of § 503(b) requires that administrative 
expenses be allowed. Unlike Rule 3002,250 § 503(b) does not require that the 
creditor file a claim under § 501(a).251 The creditors in In re Circuit City 
argued that to require that they file such a claim and make it susceptible to 
disallowance by § 502(d) would bring the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure and the Code into conflict.252 When the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure come into conflict with the Code, the matter must be 
settled in favor of the Code.253 The court in In re Circuit City, while agreeing 
that the Code trumps the Federal Rules, found no conflict between the Code 
 
 243 Id. at 571. 
 244 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). 
 245 In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 566. 
 246 See id. 
 247 Id. at 574–75. 
 248 Id. 
 249 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (emphasis added). 
 250 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a). 
 251 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). 
 252 In re Circuit City Stores, 426 B.R. at 574–75. 
 253 Id. at 575 (citing In re Pac. Atl. Trading Co., 33 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
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and the Rules.254 The court reasoned that requiring creditors to abide by the 
Rules and file their claims according to § 501(a) would not “abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right.”255 The Circuit City court determined that 
whether the creditors had to follow Rule 3002 and file their claims under 
§ 501(a) was merely a procedural matter and did not impose an excessive 
burden on § 503(b)(9) claimants.256 
A creditor arguing against the applicability of Rule 3002(a) in this 
circumstance would try to argue that requiring compliance with § 501(a) in 
filing an administrative expense claim would “modify [a] substantive right.”257 
It is unlikely that such an argument would work, however, given that the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are propagated by the Supreme Court 
and are largely viewed as dealing with merely procedural matters such as 
notice and rules of evidence.258 A creditor might also argue that the filing of 
his claim could “have a profound impact on other substantive rights, including 
the right to demand a jury trial.”259 The issue would be resolved by examining 
whether a requirement to file the claim under § 501(a) would have an impact 
on the substantive rights of the creditor or whether it would have merely a 
procedural impact. As such, courts should examine the matter on a case-by-
case basis rather than issue a blanket rule. In general, filing requirements seem 
to fall in the category of procedure rather than substance. 
When considering the question of whether disallowance is proper, it is 
important to keep in mind the unique nature of § 503(b)(9) administrative 
expense claims and how § 502(d) applies to them. Section 503(b)(9) claims are 
unique in that they are administrative expense claims that arise prepetition but 
are paid postpetition.260 The general rule is that when Congress passes a statute 
 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006)). 
 256 Id. 
 257 See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2075). 
 258 1 NORTON, supra note 43, § 5:9, at 5-21 (“In general, matters left to the rules concern giving notice; 
setting time limits; designating places to file documents; specifying the form, content and number of 
documents; indicating the method of conducting trials or hearings, including rules of evidence; regulating 
conduct of parties appearing before the court; organizing court dockets and calendars; issuing orders, process 
or judgments; processing appeals; and liquidating property of the estate. Certain other matters are left to the 
rules prescribed by the Judicial Conference such as determination of filing fees.”). 
 259 3 id. § 48:15, at 48-37 to -38. 
 260 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2006). 
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to supersede judicially created common law, it will make that intent explicit.261 
Neither in the Code itself nor in the legislative history does Congress make 
clear an intent to change the common law method for handling administrative 
expense claims. If there was no congressional intent to carve out a special 
exception for § 503(b)(9), the reasoning of the pre-2005 administrative 
expense jurisprudence is fully applicable.262 It seems unlikely that Congress 
intended §§ 502(d) and 503(b)(9) to be independent sections that are 
inapplicable to each other. The applicability of the sections to each other 
removes the last textual barrier for use of § 502(d) to disallow § 503(b)(9) and 
prevent double dipping. 
CONCLUSION 
In re Commissary Operations has brought a fascinating new angle for 
creditors in a bankruptcy dispute over preferences and new value.263 By 
allowing creditors to double dip and claim both subsequent new value and an 
administrative expense for the same goods, it allows creditors to reduce their 
preference liability by potentially large sums of money.264 Such an outcome, 
however, flies in the face of the legislative policy considerations behind the 
Code—namely, the goal of encouraging equity among creditors.265 
Perverse incentives for the debtor should also be considered. Though it 
might be rare to find a sophisticated debtor able to manipulate the Code in such 
a way as to protect its business reputation by creating a situation in which 
favored creditors can manipulate double dipping, the idea may become more 
widespread if the reasoning of In re Commissary Operations is widely 
followed. Such a situation would work against disfavored creditors with no 
such opportunity. There may also be more than just business relationships and 
 
 261 See, e.g., Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) (“The normal 
rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a 
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.”). 
 262 See, e.g., MicroAge, Inc. v. Viewsonic Corp. (In re MicroAge, Inc.), 291 B.R. 503, 509 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2002) (reasoning that § 502(d) disallowance arguments are fully applicable to all administrative expense 
claims by virtue of the fact that Congress expressed no explicit intent to bar § 502(d) from applying to 
administrative expenses when it passed the statute). In re MicroAge, however, was decided with regard to 
reclamation claims three years before the 2005 Code amendments were passed. 
 263 See Commissary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc. (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 
873 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
 264 See, e.g., S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742, 744–45 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009). The administrative expense claim in that case totaled $302,512. Id. 
 265 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177–79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5785, 6138–
40. 
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reputation involved. The double dipping argument provides an opportunity for 
the debtor to protect friends and family with whom he may again do business if 
he can make a reasonable argument that those individuals provide him with 
goods as formal suppliers. Savvy prebankruptcy planning will allow the debtor 
to defeat the policy purpose of equitable treatment of all creditors that 
underlies every section of the Code.266 
Thus, the bankruptcy court in TI Acquisition II was correct in denying 
double dipping outright.267 To allow a creditor to claim that it advanced new 
value to the debtor’s estate and then demand payment for that very same new 
value would undermine the bankruptcy goal of equity among all creditors. 
Analogizing § 503(b)(9) administrative expenses to reclamation claims268 
ensured that all substantively prepetition claims could receive the same 
treatment in that bankruptcy case. 
Some ambiguity remains, however, with regard to how this sort of case 
should be decided in jurisdictions that follow the “subsequent advance” 
approach269 to the subsequent new value defense. By viewing a § 503(b)(9) 
administrative expense as a substantively prepetition contingent claim, a strong 
argument may be made that it can be used to reduce prepetition new value, 
barring the subsequent new value defense. 
If a court in a “subsequent advance” jurisdiction refuses to recognize 
§ 503(b)(9) as a prepetition claim, all is not lost. Under the reasoning of In re 
Circuit City, a party can look to § 502(d) to argue that the administrative 
expense claim should be disallowed until the creditor disgorges the 
preference.270 Though the court in TI Acquisition I determined that § 502(d) 
was inapplicable to § 503(b)(9),271 the content of the Code and the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002(a) demonstrate 
 
 266 See generally id. at 177–79, 372–74. 
 267 TI Acquisition, LLC v. S. Polymer, Inc. (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377, 385–86 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 268 Id. at 385. 
 269 Recall that the “subsequent advance” approach prohibits any postpetition claims from diminishing the 
amount a creditor may use as new value in a subsequent new value defense. Id. at 383–84. The court argued 
that § 503(b)(9) administrative expense claims are substantively prepetition claims and thus may be used to 
reduce prepetition new value. Id. 
 270 See In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 579 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). 
 271 See S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742, 750 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 2010). 
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that § 502(d) is, in fact, applicable to § 503(b)(9) claims (see Chart 2, supra 
Section II.B.4.a).272 
Because the argument has only been examined in two bankruptcy courts, it 
remains to be seen whether others will follow their lead. It is unlikely that there 
will be a definitive statement from higher courts in the near future given the 
alleged tendency of district courts to either “rubber stamp” a bankruptcy 
court’s conclusions or to outright neglect them.273 The time sensitivity of 
bankruptcies also suggests that it is simply not worth it for the losing party in a 
bankruptcy case to appeal higher than the district court because, even if the 
appellant wins, the issue may be rendered moot at that point. 
The bankruptcy court in In re Commissary Operations was incorrect in 
allowing creditors to double dip and put themselves in a prioritized position 
over all other creditors. TI Acquisition II correctly identified this issue and, in 
denying the creditor the opportunity to double dip, set an example that future 
bankruptcy courts will hopefully follow. For those courts that do not, In re 
Circuit City has provided a tool for parties challenging a double dipping 
argument to use § 502(d) to disallow payment of the administrative expense 
claim until the creditor disgorges its preference. In re Circuit City 
demonstrated that the logic behind holding § 502(d) inapplicable to § 503(b)(9) 
claims in TI Acquisition I was flawed. 
Double dipping allows certain creditors to defeat the preference system of 
the Code. Allowing a creditor to count the same goods in a subsequent new 




 272 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 502(a), 502(d) (2006). 
 273 Commission Considers Venue, Jurisdiction, Appellate Changes at February Meeting, supra note 12, at 
13; see also D’Angelo, supra note 12, at 610. 
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§ 547 and undermine the foundational policy goal of the Code—encouraging 
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